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To better understand the process and the conflicts in-
herent in the acquisition of training devices, a case histo-
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in the framework of the "total ILS concept" as applied to
weapon system programs is attempted. Changing managerial
perspectives are viewed as a consequence to "lessons
learned" and the attendant realization of the need for practi-
cal tradeoffs in terms of trainer capability, cost and
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The acute concern by military planners and weapon system
operators for cost effectiveness, training effectiveness and
more recently fuel conservation has led to a heightened aware-
ness of the benefits accruing from the use of training de-
vices. The procurement of an aircraft training device is but
one element in the costly and complex process of supporting
an aircraft weapon system. A heavy reliance on state-of-the-
art technologies has caused aircraft procurement to be re-
plete with problems that are difficult and costly to solve.
On a much smaller scale, but no less difficult, are the tech-
nical and administrative problems experienced in training
device procurement - procurements which must frequently fol-
low in lock-step fashion with the aircraft acquisition pro-
gram.
The purpose of this thesis is to determine, through an
in-depth analysis of A-7E Weapon System Trainer procurements,
the significant factors which warrant management's considera-
tion during the process of providing one element of logistic
support - the acquisition of training devices - for an air-
craft weapons system program. A secondary purpose is to pro-
vide, by means of the cases presented, an educational tool
for students of Weapon System Acquisition Management. The
intent is to illustrate the conflicts and problems which
"would be" program managers must learn to identify and

resolve, if future projects are to survive and meet their
objectives.
B. RESEARCH METHOD
In conducting the research for this study, full advantage
was taken of the opportunity to examine all pertinent re-
cords available in the Offices of the Naval Air Systems
Command, Weapons Training Division (AIR-413)> and the Naval
Technical Equipment Center, Orlando, Florida. Although ex-
tensive interviews were conducted with a significant number
of Government personnel, time and funding precluded meeting
all persons associated with the projects, particularly those
in industry.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Section II briefly describes the background and relevant
significance of training devices within the military environ-
ment. The process for acquiring training devices is pre-
sented in Section III. Sections IV and V are included so
that the reader may acquire a perspective for subsequent
case histories and discussions which follow in Sections VI
and VII.
D. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to express his appreciation to the
many people, whose gracious allocation of many hours from
their schedules made this study possible. A debt of
gratitude is owed to the staff personnel at the Naval Air
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Systems Command, Attack Training Branch (AIR-413) and at
the Naval Training Equipment Center, Orlando, Florida, who
supported this effort and assisted in making travel arrange-
ments, in scheduling interviews, and in solving the numerous
other problems associated with thesis research.
To gain an insight into the real world of training de-
vice acquisition management, interviews with the following
were conducted:
Mr. D. B. Adams, General Engineer, Weapons Training Division,
Attack Training Branch (AIR-4131)
Mr. J. Schreiber, General Engineer, Weapons Training Divi-
sion, Attack Training Branch (AIR-4131D)
Mr. E. H. Sweeney, Contract Negotiator, Air and Research
Procurement Division, Attack and Air Defense Trainers
Branch (N-611)
Mr. J. Burns, Engineer, Air Warfare Systems Division, Attack
Trainers Branch (N-2221)
Mr. L. Lanchoney, Air Program Control Officer, Program
Planning Division (N-3201)
Commander G. C. Warneke, Director of Procurement Services
Department (N-6)
Lieutenant Commander R. Norton, Officer-in-Charge, Fleet
Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group Detach-
ment, Naval Air Station, Lemoore, California
Mr. M. E. Biciocchi, Deputy Director of Procurement Control
and Clearance Division (NMAT 022B)

II. AIRCRAFT TRAINING DEVICES: BACKGROUND
A. EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
In its simplest form, simulation means "copying." Simu-
lators are training devices employed in copying conditions
and phenomena likely to occur in actual performance. The
use of simulators as a training tool has increased propor-
tionally with increases in technology which enable higher
fidelity "copying" of actual operational conditions.
The high cost of flying and a realization that the air-
craft itself is probably the poorest classroom ever devised
gave birth to a need for some kind of ground trainer as a
substitute for the aircraft. From the time Ed Link fabri-
cated the first model in 1929 > the evolution of flight simu-
lators has been characterized by remarkable advances in
"copying" fidelity. Over the years the value of flight
simulators has been amply proven. The Link trainer which
was widely used for pilot training in the Second World War
was a precursor to a variety of much more elaborate sophis-
ticated devices used today for training astronauts, military
and commercial aviators, as well as for research and develop-
mental purposes.
The early training devices were intended to furnish
training in aircraft normal and emergency flight procedures.
Little effort was directed toward replicating the performance
or mission characteristics of a specific aircraft model.
During the sixties, rapid advances in computer technology
10

radically altered the capabilities of simulator state-of-
the-art. It now became possible to "simulate" every possible
•performance characteristic of an aircraft through mathemati-
cal modeling and computer programming.
The capability to "authentically" simulate a specific
aircraft model, so as to provide training "realism", has
been pursued and accomplished through the use of actual air-
craft components integrated with simulator subsystems.
Features such as radar and visual presentations, motion
systems, and programmed control stick forces can now pro-
vide a realism that approximates the operational character-
istics of the parent system to a heretofore unbelievable
degree.
B. SIGNIFICANCE
Many of today's training devices are far more costly
than the aircraft of World War II, but they can readily pay
for themselves from the benefits accrued from their use.
The potential net savings derived from simulator usage is
dependent upon the amount of actual flight time that simula-
tor training can replace, i.e. the amount of performance
learned in a training device which is transferable to per-
formance in an aircraft. The cost of operating simulators
is considerably less than the cost of flying an aircraft.
11

For example, the average hourly operating cost for an A-7
aircraft is approximately $353 compared with $30 for the
simulator.
A Navy and Air Force sponsored study predicted that with
improved simulators and training techniques, flight hours
during basic pilot training could be reduced in the mid-
1930' s by about 1+6 to 49 percent. The extent that simula-
tor training can replace flight training in tactical aircraft
used in intermediate (training) and operational squadrons is
unknown. No standard of measurement exists to accurately
assess the amount of flight training in tactical aircraft
which can be replaced by future simulator use, nevertheless
substantial savings are possible. According to 1973 GAO
estimates, annual savings approximating $455M (million) can
be realized from a replacement of 2 5 percent of operational
training by training in simulators; a 50 percent replacement
2
would save about $91CM annually.
The cost saving features of simulators can be extended
to increases in safer training while learning to fly com-
plex and expensive modern aircraft. The prevention of a
single accident resulting in the loss of an aircraft and
possibly that of its crewmember(s) , when attributable to a
transfer of training acquired in a simulator, justifies
U.S. Comptroller General's Report to the Congress,
Greater Use of Fl i ght Simulators in Military Pilot Training












and demonstrates the worth of training devices. The possi-
bility of an accident always exists during a flight, but
such opportunities are absent while using a simulator.
Training in high-stress situations, e.g. emergencies such as
engine or flight control malfunctions, is not always feasible
nor practical without imposing undue risk to the pilot and
the aircraft. Simulators afford such training opportunities
and as often as is deemed necessary for each individual pilot.
The time spent in simulators allows pilots the opportuni-
ty to devote a greater percentage of actual flying time
practicing the complex maneuvers which cannot be fully simu-
lated. Pilot proficiency is further enhanced by the "real-
time" and instant playback features made possible by digital
computers. Programmers can insert every possible performance
characteristic of an aircraft into the computer. Thus, any
move by a pilot operating a simulator can be instantly analyzed
and recorded for future playback. More accurate measures of
pilot proficiency are possible using objective grading
criteria rather than relying on subjective judgments inherent
in inflight evaluations.
Aircraft freed from use in the training role could be
reassigned to operational squadrons, thereby increasing
operational readiness. The support effort required to main-




Breakthroughs in simulator technology in the sixties and
the enactment of a Federal Aviation Administration regulation
in 1967 - essentially allowing the airlines to replace much
of their flight training with simulators - have enabled the
commercial airlines to reduce to an absolute minimum, the
3
amount of time spent in aircraft training. Airline pilots
can transition to and be certified in new type air-
craft through simulator training and the satisfactory demons-
tration of a minimum number of inflight maneuvers - most of
which can be performed within the duration of a single
flight.
Military aviators, in addition to learning the more
routine flight skills required of commercial pilots, must
also acquire tactical skills such as bombing, strafing, air-
to-air combat maneuvering, etc. The military services, un-
like the airlines, have not always purchased the most ad-
vanced simulators as technology became available. This was
true partly because of operational priorities and require-
ments dictated by commitments in Southeast Asia, and, to
some degree, because simulators and aircraft compete for the
same procurement funds. In addition, the services in the
past had been cautious in recognizing advancements in
simulator state-of-the-art technology. Principally because






the development of improved simulators which could satisfy
many of the complex military training needs.
Military disengagement from the Southeast Asian Conflict
and the return to peacetime operations, overshadowed by a
drastically shrinking defense budget in terms of buying
power, have resulted in an increased emphasis by the services
in simulation. Current accelerated efforts emphasizing the
improvement of simulator capabilities can be attributed to
an increasing concern for cost effectiveness, training ef-
fectiveness, safety and more recently fuel conservation.
C. TYPES OF AIRCRAFT TRAINING DEVICES
Training devices are developed and procured to satisfy a
variety of military needs for simulation in ground, air, sur-
face and subsurface related functions. To provide familiar-
ization, transition and refresher training for aircrews,
flight simulator (aircraft cockpit simulator) design in-
corporates provisions for:
1. Aircraft normal and emergency procedures,
2. Navigation procedures and techniques utilizing
onboard aircraft systems,
3. Aircraft flight performance capabilities and
limitations,
4. Aircraft tactical procedures utilizing on-board
aircraft equipments, and
^Lt. Gen. William V. McBride, USAF, "Simulation in Under-




5. Aircraft weapon system delivery use/operation.
To accomplish the basic training provided for in item
1. , the Navy procures Cockpit Procedures Trainers (CPT).
These devices normally do not provide any weapons delivery,
radar or navigation capability. Operational Flight Trainers
(OFT) are procured to fulfill items 1. , 2., and 3. training
requirements. Weapon System Trainers (WST) are procured to
satisfy full mission training needs encompassing items 1.
through 5.
Occasionally, specialized training devices are procured
which have an unusual combination of two or more of the five
training capabilities and are designed to provide intensive
training in a particular aspect of the aircraft mission. In
the A-7E program, two such special devices, Night Carrier
Landing Trainers (NCLT), were procured possessing item 1.,
2., and 3. training capabilities in addition to a simulated
visual system. The NCLT provides specialized training in
5
night carrier aircraft operations.
5U.S. Naval Air Systems Command, Weapons Training Divi-
sion, Attack Training Branch Files, A-7 Attack Aircraft File
N00019-72-C-0988, Negotiation Clearance Memorandum , No.
11S00, December 20, 1972, p. T.
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III. AIRCRAFT TRAINING DEVICES; THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
A. THE INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT CONCEPT
The procurement and operation of military weapon systems
are complex and costly processes. To optimize the perform-
ance of weapon systems throughout their life cycles while
ensuring that an optimum balance in resource expenditure is
achieved, DOD Directive 5000.1, SECNAVINST 5000.1 and other
related issuances direct the consideration of integrated
logistic support (ILS) planning as a principal design para-
meter. A total operational system can be divided into the
prime mission system and the support system. The prime
mission system is that set of resources and functions re-
quired to perform the mission with which it is concerned.
The logistic support system is a composite of resources and
functions required to keep the prime mission system in a
state of readiness to perform the mission. The word
"integrated" refers to a concurrent consideration of require-
ments for both the prime system and the logistic support
system during all phases of system acquisition.
One of the many functions essential to the integrated
logistic support concept is the necessity to provide train-
ing support for all weapon systems introduced into the Fleet.
An integral element in the training support required in major
aircraft programs is the design, development and production




Essential to the establishment and continued support of
suitable training programs is the close and effective co-
ordination among the Offices of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval
Material, Chief of Naval Personnel, Chief of Naval Training,
Fleet Commanders in Chief and other principals. The primary
activities which are specifically tasked with formulating
and implementing the actions necessary for procurement of
aircraft training devices are as follows:
Chief of Naval Operations, Aviation Manpower and Training
Division (OP-59)
The lead agency responsible for the overall supervision
of Naval Aviation Training Programs is the Aviation Manpower
and Training Division (OP-59) • Acting under the guidance of
the Director, Naval Education and Training (OP-099)> the
Division's mission is to fulfill the responsibilities of the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) with respect
to aviation manpower and training requirements of the Navy.
The preparation of plans and coordinating the establish-
ment of requirements incident to aviation training devices
is a function of the Aviation Training Device Requirements
Branch (OP-596). The Branch provides planning and programming
information relative to aircraft training devices for in-
corporation into the Navy Five Year Plan, and assists in the
preparation of planning and programming documents relating to
IS

associated budget submissions. As an element sponsor in air-
craft programs, OP-596 sponsors research and development,
directs evaluation and controls the assignment of aviation
training devices.
Naval Air Systems Command, Project Manager ( PMA)
The Project Manager (PMA) is chartered by the Commander,
Naval Air Systems Command, and is responsible for ensuring
that all vital elements of a completely effective and combat-
ready aircraft weapon system are obtained on a properly
phased basis to meet operational requirements. The PMA's
role places a premium on coordinated planning, scheduling,
and funding of all elements, the continuous evaluation of
progress, the early identification of significant deficien-
cies or slippages, and expeditious corrective action in
problem areas.
Integrated Logistic Support Manager
The ILS Manager, a principal member of the project office
staff, is directly responsible to the PMA for the develop-
ment of integrated logistic support planning and its execu-
tion. He coordinates the planning, monitoring and project
management control functions for each of the individual
organizational entities performing logistic support tasks.
Logistic Element Manager
A Logistic Element Manager is responsible for ensuring
that adequate planning for and availability of his integrated
19

logistic support element (e.g. supply support, facilities,
personnel and training support, etc.) is accomplished in
accordance with the milestones identified in the Weapon Sys-
tem Integrated Logistic Support Plan. In providing approp-
riate qualitative and quantitative inputs to the logistic
support of a weapon system, a Logistic Element Manager fre-
quently acts as an Acquisition Manager, i.e., he performs
functions similar to those of a Project Manager, but only
those functions that relate to the procurement of specific
subsystems, devices or equipment.
Naval Air Systems Command, Weapons Training Division (AIR-04)
The Weapons Training Division (AIR-04) is responsible
for the planning, development, establishment, and follow-on
support of training programs which provide for the training
of Navy personnel in the operation and maintenance of avia-
tion weapon systems. Division personnel function as Logistic
Element Managers for personnel and training support within
project office organizations for aircraft weapon system
programs.
The focal point for initiating and implementing the
efforts directed toward satisfying the training requirements
of attack aircraft programs is the Attack Training Branch
(AIR-413)- When exercising its authority as Principal
Development Activity (PDA), AIR-413 coordinates the required
programmatic, technical and contractual functions for air-
craft training device acquisition. Facilities planning is
20

coordinated with the Naval Facilities Engineering Command for
construction or modifications of structures required for
training device installation.
Naval Training Equipment Center
The Naval Training Equipment Center (NTEC) responds to
requirements from the Chief of Naval Training and the Chief
of Naval Material incident to the acquisition/support of
training material. As the principal technical agent for
Naval training programs, NTEC, when directed, functions as
either the Principal Development Activity (PDA) or "Other
Support Activity" for training device procurement.
Fleet Project Team
The Fleet Project Team is a group of knowledgeable re-
presentatives from the Fleet or other user Commands, desig-
nated by Cognizant Commander(s) to assist and advise the
PDA on operational training matters in the development, ac-
quisition, acceptance and introduction of aviation training
devices.
C. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION
The planning process utilized for training device require-
ments determination and procurement is intimately tied to the
selection and planning process for acquisition of the air-
craft weapon system. During the conceptual phase, the need
for a weapon system is defined by CNO and stated in an
Operational Requirement (OR). The OR solicits a Development
21

Proposal (DP) from NAVAIR in which the technical basis for
the aircraft acquisition program is established through
feasibility studies. Basic operation and support concepts
are identified, and early logistic support planning commences,
An iterative process, developed through a formal and informal
dialogue between OP- 59 and AIR-04, cites the applicable
training requirements and cost elements that relate to the
logistic support of the proposed program.
D. THE NAVY TRAINING PLAN PROCESS
The establishment of procedures and the assignment of
responsibilities for planning, programming and implementing
actions necessary to provide training support for new system
development is promulgated in OPNAVINST 1500. SG. Total train-
ing requirements are addressed including shipboard, staff and
student billets, personnel, training equipment, devices,
aids, instructional material, military construction/modifi-
cation of training facilities, services and all other re-
sources to support initial and follow-on training operations.
Ideally, these requirements are incorporated in the planning,
programming, and budgeting process at the inception of sys-
tem development and made increasingly definitive as develop-
ment progresses.
The source document serving as the official statement of
personnel and training requirements to support introduction
and use of new systems, equipments and other developments is
the Navy Training Plan (NTP). The format for a standard NTP
22

addresses the following major areas: Technical Program Data,
Billet/Personnel/Training/Schedule and Financial Requirements,
Major Milestones, Decisions Required, and Points of Contract.
It is the NTP wherein the requirement for procurement of a
training device to support an aircraft program is stated.
Further guidance for the preparation and implementation
of Navy Training Plans for the aviation community is provided
in OPNAVINST 1500. 11G. This instruction establishes policies,
responsibilities and procedures for the Naval Aviation Train-
ing Program, serves as a reference point for related direc-
tives, and provides for coordination among the various ele-
ments of the program.
The multiple functions of project management are set in-
to high gear when approval for development of a new capabi-
lity, such as that provided by an aircraft weapon system, is
granted by the Defense System Acquisition Review Council
(DSARC). So as to provide the resources and functions
necessary to assure the effective and economical support of
the aircraft weapon system throughout its life cycle, a
Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) is initiated by the ILS
Manager. The development and continuing update of a Navy
Training Plan normally originates as a response to the LSA
process and the subsequent formulation of an Integrated
Logistic Support Plan (ILSP).
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) is the Principal
Development Activity (PDA) for aircraft programs. The focal
23

point for all activity associated with the acquisition pro-
gram is the IMA. The Project ILS Manager acts as an agent
for the PMA in all logistic matters. Providing functional
assistance to the ILS Manager as ILS Element Managers for
personnel and training is the Weapons Training Division (AIR-
04).
Subsequent to approval of a new aircraft program, it is
AIR-04' s responsibility to examine the human factors involved
and to recommend to OP-59 the establishment of a training
requirement through the Navy Training Plan process.
Based on AIR-04 1 s recommendation, OP-59 initiates action
to develop a draft NTP by soliciting information as required
from concerned bureaus, commands and offices. The convening
date of a Navy Training Plan Conference (NTPC) is announced
and the draft NTP, compiled by AIR-04 and submitted to OP-59,
is distributed to all principals.
The planning time frame for NTP preparation must allow
sufficient time for training support to be accomplished be-
fore personnel are required to operate and maintain the new
system in the Fleet. Hence, critical time elements have been
established as follows:
1. Technical Program Data is to be provided within 90
days of CNO approval of a new system development.
2. A formal approved NTP is required at least three
years in advance of the planned weapon system IOC (Initial
24

Operational Capability) date. (The need for flexibility in
processing accelerated procurement programs is acknowledged.
)
The NTPC, convened and chaired by OP-59, provides the
principal forum for modifications to and ratification of the
draft NTP. Based on the inputs received during the NTPC,
AIR-04 prepares and distributes a revised NTP proposal for
review and for comment by CNO as appropriate. Approximately
30 days after distribution of the proposed NTP, CNO approval
action is taken and the NTP is promulgated for implementation,
As the weapon system progresses in detail and accuracy, the
NTP is further developed and kept current by updating con-
ferences.
The approved NTP is a primary source document for pro-
gramming and budgeting purposes. Budget requests for ele-
ments identified in the NTP are formulated by AIR-04 and sub-
mitted to CNO in accordance with established directives for
inclusion in the DOD Budget. Authorized funds are in turn
allocated to AIR-04 either by the PMA or directly by CNO for
the purpose of accomplishing the NTP. Other action includes
incorporation of the NTP into the Integrated Logistic Sup-
port Plan for the aircraft program as well as incorporation
of essential elements of the NTP such as schedules, personnel
and training resource requirements, etc., into the Advanced
Procurement Plan and similarly related documents.
The contractual and technical responsibility and authori-
ty to develop and acquire a specific aircraft training
25

device is either assigned to NTEC or retained by NAVAIR as
per an agreement delineated in NAVMATINST 5450.23/CNTINST
5450. 8. The matrix organizations of NAVAIR and NTEC are
comparably structured in the functional areas of project
management, material acquisition and logistic support to
adequately support the administration of a training device
project by either activity. In those procurements in which
AIR-04 functions as the PDA, NTEC acts as "Other Support
Activity" by providing technical cognizance for trainer
development and life cycle management. As the prime source
of engineering support, NTEC in most cases has been the
principal originator of technical documentation requirements,
e.g. Military Characteristics, Statements of Work, Specifica-
tions, Data Item Descriptions, etc., as well as the formula-
tor of cost estimates for budgeting purposes. When NTEC
functions as the PDA, AIR-04 provides program guidance as the
ILS Element Manager.
To assist the PDA, a Fleet Project Team is assigned to
act as the Cognizant Commander's representative in operation-
al training matters concerning the development, acquisition,
acceptance and introduction of aviation training devices.
As the PDA's interface with the Fleet, the Team functions in
an advisory capacity as reviewer, inspector and testor in
order to coordinate and validate projected trainer capabili-




E. THE ACQUISITION TIME FRAME
When viewed over time, the duration for the planning,
programming and development phases of an average training
device acquisition approximates three to four years. The
planning phase extends from the initial determination of a
requirement for a training device to NTP approval by CNO 10
to 12 months later. During this period Military Character-
istics are written and preliminary budget proposals are sub-
mitted. During the 8 to 10 month programming phase, techni-
cal requirements are specified, a procurement package is as-
sembled, and funding allotments are approved. Procurement
solicitation, proposal evaluation, negotiation and contract
award is usually an additional three to five months in dura-
tion. Contractor lead time in recent procurements has been
approximately two years after award for design, fabrication
and installation of an aircraft training device.
27

IV. PERSPECTIVES IN PROCUREMENT
Characteristics which permeated the military procurement
environment throughout the 1960's affected the manner in
which military programs have been and are currently being
conducted. The increasing size, complexity and cost of wea-
pon systems created challenging new problems and, hopefully,
the means to cope with them. Differing managerial approaches,
many originating at the Secretary of Defense level, were ad-
vocated and implemented. For example, policy and practice
in the mid-1960' s called for fixed price type development
contracts with the contractor taking the risk for successful
program completion. Once having awarded a contract, the
military was expected to involve itself very little in man-
aging the program. On the other hand, the quickening pace
of technology resulted in a proliferation of contract modifi-
cations and constructive changes as program sponsors and
project managers strived to keep their systems abreast of
the state-of-the-art advances during development programs
lasting at times beyond four or five years. The ability of
industry to accommodate changing military requirements, while
assuming and retaining the risk for contractual performance,
was frequently lacking. A well publicized outcome has been
a cost growth phenomenon that draws attention from Congress
and the public alike.
Overshadowing the entire spectrum of defense procurement
during the mid and late 1960's was the need to support the
28

military effort in Southeast Asia. The Armed Services have
traditionally operated under the assumption that weapon sys-
tems and equipment, on an individual basis, must possess
the maximum performance that technology can provide. The
pursuit of technical superiority in defense programs border-
ing on the edge of state-of-the-art technologies inevitably
relegated all other program considerations to roles of
secondary importance. The emphasis on "performance" received
a running mate when the Vietnam War created an urgent need
for the rapid development, production, and deployment of
systems and equipment to augment and/or replace those in
operation. Now along with performance requirements, the
consideration of "schedules" became a principal criterion
which encapsulated many defense program decisions. During
the requirements determination phase, military planners se-
lected IOC dates based on the operational need for a particu-
lar weapon system or hardware. The schedule for the acquisi-
tion program was then structured to achieve the specified
IOC date. The opportunities for tradeoffs within a program
were minimized due to the explicit constraints of perform-
ance and schedules requirements. Aside from the resultant
cost growth phenomenon, the sense of urgency stemming from
the Vietnam Conflict manifested itself in other forms such
as less than adequate planning for logistic and life cycle
support, a recourse to the most expedient but not necessarily
the most accepted administrative and contractual practices,
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program acceleration efforts, acceptance of lower field
reliability, and similar outcomes.
By the end of the decade, unit costs of weapon systems
had risen to such an extent and funds available to DOD were
becoming so limited that a considerable disparity between
requirements and resources had developed. There came a
realization that the "best" system design is not necessarily
achieved by maximizing individual unit performance only, but
is a function of need, performance, life cycle cost and
quantities needed to address the threat. It became widely
recognized in principle that current cost pressures dictate
a total system approach (development, production, operating
and support).
To provide coherence and structure to defense acquisition
policy, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard directed
the issuance of DOD Directive 5000.1, "Acquisition of Major
Defense Systems" in July 1971 (See Appendix B). The primary
objective of the Directive is the establishment of policy
that seeks an optimum balance between requirements and re-
sources. The focus of effort is directed toward an iterative
process of program planning, assessment, and execution with
recourse to practical tradeoffs made between system capabili-
ty, cost and schedule.
It is primarily in the light of DOD Directive 5000.1
that the history and analysis of A-7E WST procurements, con-
tained herein, shall be presented.
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V. A-7 AIRCRAFT PROGRAM HISTORY
The A-7 aircraft is a land/carrier-based, subsonic,
medium range, visual light attack aircraft capable of carry-
ing tactical nuclear weapons and practically all types of
conventional ordnance in the Navy's inventory, while perform-
ing close tactical air support or interdiction missions.
The A-7E provides a substantial increase in navigation accu-
racy, weapons delivery accuracy, radius, and load carrying
capability over the A-4 and earlier versions of the A-7 which
it is replacing.
On 19 March 1964 BUWEPS contract Now 64-363F was awarded
to LTV Aerospace Corporation for developing and producing
the A-7A aircraft. On 28 March 1966, just after the last
17 of 199 aircraft were purchased on the A-7A contract, an
Advanced Procurement Plan (APP #5-67) was issued that covered
the continued purchase of the A-7 series for the Navy. On
31 March 1966, Determination and Findings (D&F) #0003-67 ap-
proved the procurement of 230 A-7 type aircraft. Contract-
ually the procurement began 11 July 1966 when the Navy added
a long lead-time supplement to the basic A-7A contract. In
November 1966, the Navy separated the long lead-time funding
for 230 A-7B's from the A-7A contract. A letter contract
was issued, later to be finalized on 29 July 196S as a firm




Advanced Procurement Plan #53-68 of 17 July 1967 was one
of the first official documents addressing the Navy's con-
sideration of the A-7E program. Externally, the A-7E appeared
to replicate the A-7A and A-7B. Internally, however, the
radically new A-7E design called for computer-integrated
navigation and weapon system avionics that pushed the state-
of-the-art, a rapid-fire Gattling gun and a new turbo-fan
engine rated at 30$ more thrust than that of the A-7B. Be-
cause of these technology advances, it proved difficult
throughout the aircraft development phase to establish firm
aircraft specifications. (This problem significantly impacted
the development of the A-7E Weapon System Trainer, Device
2F84B.)
Under authority of D&F #0003-67 on 7 December 1967, the
Navy decided to immediately buy the A-7E. This was possible
because only 196 A-7B's were ordered while 230 A-7 type air-
craft had been authorized by the D&F. With this authority,
long lead-time items and funds all available, the Navy chose
not to proceed through the normal budget lead-time, and the
A-7E decision was written into that fiscal year's procure-
ment. A Business Clearance Memorandum was approved on 28
February 1968 to issue a letter contract to LTV for 7 A-7E's.
On 20 June 1968, an additional 150 A-7E's were added to
the original A-7E letter contract. Subsequent single and
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multi-year contracts have continued to be issued keeping
the LTV A-7 production line open to this date.
Christopher S. Gates, "Letter Contracts Case," The
A-7 Attack Aircraft; Contract History Emphasizing The Navy
Business Clearance Process , Thesis G245, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, (1973), pp. 46-57.
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VI, DEVICE 2FB4B PROJECT HISTORY
A. INTRODUCTION
The A-7 Weapon System Program was no exception to the
conflicts, problems and constraints inherent in systems
acquisition during the late sixties. No less a victim of
the circumstances and factors influencing project management
decisions was the procurement of A-7E Weapon System Trainers,
Device 2F&1+B. The requirement for an accelerated trainer
procurement to coincide with the aircraft program necessitated
an abbreviated planning phase - the net effect of which was
realized in a series of technical, administrative and con-
tractual problems which persisted well beyond the scheduled
trainer delivery dates. Timely trainer delivery was optim-
istically predicated on the availability of aircraft parts
and data, no financial difficulties, and no manpower problems.
With the exception of ample funds, these problems, exacer-
bated to some degree by contractor performance, precluded the
accomplishment of a successful procurement.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL AGREEMENT
Meetings with cognizant NAVAIR (AIR-04) and Naval Train-
ing Equipment Center personnel in 1964 resulted in an agree-
ment in which NTEC would function as the Principal Develop-
ment Activity for managing the procurement, development and
production of A-7 Weapon System Trainers. As the ILS
Element Manager for Weapon System Training Support, the
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primary role of AIR-04 was to monitor and provide guidance
as necessary to the training device projects. The efforts
required to logistically support the trainer projects were
conducted by NTEC somewhat independent of the formal aircraft
ILS program. Coordination between the A-7 Project Office
and NTEC was effected by the AIR-04 ILS Element Manager in-
terfacing directly with the A-7 Project Manager (PMA-235)
and with cognizant NTEC personnel.
C. DEVICE 2F84
In May 1966, a prototype A-7A WST, Device 2F&4 was de-
livered to the Navy. The WST flight section was designed
and developed by Melpar Inc. and the tactics portion was
provided by the Link Group, General Precision Systems, Inc.
The first production A-7A WST was delivered in September
1966. The third and fourth units of Device 2F$4 were
scheduled for delivery by 1 June 1967 and 1 March 1963, re-
spectively, under fixed price incentive contracts.
The third unit was delivered to and accepted at Marine
Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina. Subsequently,
however, a Presidential Memorandum terminated the requirement
for operation of A-7 aircraft by the Marine Corps. The de-
vice was then shipped to the Pentagon, Washington, D. C,
for a week of display purposes, after which it was delivered
to and installed at the Naval Training Equipment Center,
Orlando, Florida. It remained at NTEC until direction was
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provided to update it to the A-7E WST, following which it was
returned to the Melpar Plant in Falls Church, Virginia.
D. PLANNING PHASE
In May 1967, a Program Change Request was drafted by
the A-7 Project Office proposing procurement of an improved
version of the A-7 aircraft. Preliminary design data for
the new A-7E aircraft was made available to NTEC for the
purpose of developing Military Characteristics for A-7E Wea-
pon System Trainers. Military Characteristics, approved in
June, were formulated by NTEC with the intent of designing
and fabricating new A-7E trainers. Nevertheless, for pur-
poses of expediency and anticipated cost savings, PMA-235,
supported by AIR-04, made the decision to modify the A-7A
WST, Units #3 and #4 to the A-7E configuration. A meeting
was held at NTEC on 19 October 1967 and both the Flight Con-
tractor (Melpar) and the Tactics Contractor (Link) were ad-
vised of the Navy's intent to update these units to the
A-7E configuration and, as a consequence, the Navy desired
to extend delivery of the fourth unit through June 1963.
Both contractors stated their willingness to cooperate ac-
knowledging a credit would be due the Government for those
items not performed and stated that additional costs would
result from storage of the incompleted trainer.
In December 1967, Secretary of Defense approval of the
Program Change Request officially provided for procurement
of A-7E aircraft by the Navy. The formulation of a Navy
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Training Plan for the A-7E Weapon System Program was initi-
ated, and a Cost and Lead Time Estimate for weapon system
trainers was prepared. Based on aircraft parts being avail-
able seven months after contract award, the earliest likely
WST RFT (Ready for Training) date was estimated to be 14
months after award of contract.
During the Navy Training Plan Conference held in Febru-
ary 1963, it was decided that, based on the need to provide
weapon systems trainers by March 1969 and the technical and
administrative difficulties of having another contractor
modify the existing units, sole source procurement was
deemed necessary. Sole source procurement with Link and
Melpar was justified pursuant to 10 U. S. Code 2304(a) (14)
based on the fact that these contractors were doing current
A-7 work and had a substantial investment in this type train-
er. Competitive procurement may have resulted in consider-
able duplication of effort. NTEC, however, had stated that
achieving a March 1969 RFT date was not feasible because
the aircraft design was not firm enough to permit completion
of a procurement package. In addition, the availability of
parts was estimated to be eleven months after order. There-
fore, Link and Melpar were queried on 1& March as to the
earliest delivery dates to which they would commit them-
selves. Both contractors stated that if data were avail-
able and aircraft parts could be delivered six months after
contract award, a trainer could be delivered eleven months
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after award. Meeting this delivery date was predicated on
timely delivery of aircraft parts and data, and no financial
difficulties nor manpower problems.
The increasing tempo of air operations in Southeast Asia
imposed a singular urgency to the A-7E program. FMA-235
stated that WST RFT dates of March and May 1969 were criti-
cal for providing timely pilot training support compatible
with the aircraft IOC date. In an attempt to expedite con-
tract administration lead-time so as to facilitate achieving
the stated RFT dates, NTEC decided that the optimum approach
was to issue Change Orders to Link and Melpar under exist-
ing contracts.
E. CONTRACT PERFORMANCE
1. Parts and Data Problems
On 2 May 196S, contract modifications were issued to
Melpar and Link providing direction to modify and update De-
vice 2F&4 (A-7A WST), Units #3 and #4 to Device 2F34B (A-7E
WST), Units #1 and #2. RFT dates of 31 March 1969 and 30
April 1969 were specified. A Clarification Conference was
held in mid-May with the contractors and LTV representatives
for the purpose of discussing the Government's technical re-
quirements.
Following receipt in early July of the contractors 1
proposals (See Exhibit (VI-1) for proposed delivery sched-
ule), considerable effort was directed at technical clarifi-
cation of the specifications for the aircraft and the weapon
3S

system trainer. This effort continued through August, and
in early September it became evident that serious problems
had arisen. A meeting convened in Dallas, Texas, and at-
tended by representatives from Link, Melpar, LTV and NTEC




Adequate data was not being received from either
LTV, the aircraft manufacturer, or from IBM who held proprie-
tory rights to the computer math model. It appeared that it
would be necessary for Melpar and Link to negotiate directly
with IBM to acquire the necessary computer data. Data was
essential not only for the detailed design effort, but also
for programming the computer software for simulation of the
aircraft operational flight characteristics and for the in-
tegration of the various avionic subsystems.
b. Aircraft Parts
Delivery schedules for aircraft parts provided
by LTV did not meet the delivery dates required by Link and
Melpar. Unless firm contractual commitments relative to
price and delivery of parts were received from LTV by Melpar
and Link, a slippage of the RFT dates appeared likely.
c. Design
The aircraft design was changed to include the
Projected Map Display. The impact of this new requirement
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The monthly Progress Status Review of the A-7E
WST Project was held by NAVAIR on 2 October 1963. Milestones
established during the Dallas Parts and Data Meeting for
determining the ultimate impact of delayed parts and data
were analyzed. It was determined that the delivery dates
for aircraft parts quoted by LTV ranged from 2-|- to 5 months
later than that required by the trainer contractors to meet
the RFT dates. Data availability was approximately one to
two months behind schedule, and a NASA priority contract had
delayed delivery of components for the flight section compu-
ter. Consequently, a new schedule was established. The RFT
dates for Link remained unchanged; the dates for Melpar
had slipped to May and August 1969.
In response to the project delays, PMA-235 di-
rected LTV to accelerate delivery so as to make available
all parts by 31 December 1963. Increased communication be-
tween LTV and the trainer contractors was encouraged to
identify and resolve the more significant data problems. At
this time, PMA-235 made the decision that A-7E WST, Unit #1,
should be delivered with less than all subsystems operable,
if deemed necessary to meet the RFT date.
A-7E WST funding status was also reviewed at
this time. As a result of an underestimate of the price of
aircraft parts and an extended period of performance due to
the unavailability of aircraft parts and data, an increase
over the contractors' proposed costs existed. NTEC had been
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provided $3.1M (million) for the modification of the two
trainers and the contractors' proposals now totalled $4.5M.
To satisfy the $1.4M funding shortage for Units #1 and #2,
funds were reclaimed from follow-on WST procurements which
had already been planned and programmed.
The A-7E WST Progress Status Review held on IS
November 1963 made it apparent that many of the conditions
on which the RFT dates were predicated could not be met and
that the RFT dates would slip accordingly. (See Exhibits
(VT-2) and (VI-3) for the revised delivery schedules.) LTV
indicated that all requested aircraft data would be available
as of 15 December 1968 rather than the previously scheduled
date of 22 October. Link had begun to experience failure of
aircraft component parts and long lead-times in obtaining
replacement items. Melpar' s difficulty in obtaining adequate
support from IBM regarding computer data still had not been
resolved. PMA-235, displeased with the lack of contractual
agreements between Link and LTV directed both parties to take
positive action to rectify the problem. The Project Manager
further stated that if there were any additional delays, all
parties would have his personal support so as to expedite
the A-7E WST development.
The December 1968 and January 1969 A-7E WST
Progress Status Reviews showed Link to be progressing on
schedule despite a parts failure problem. Action was taken
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production line and supplying them to the contractor. Melpar
had received almost all of the LTV data required as of January,
but was still plagued by insufficient data from IBM. Sub-
stantial progress was made in the areas of design, program-
ming and math modeling. The only "critical" effort remaining
at that time was the design and modeling of the Navigation/
Weapon Delivery Computer along with the integration of a new
avionics subsystem. The success of this effort was contin-
gent upon the timely acquisition of data from IBM. The de-
livery of aircraft parts was approximately 55$ complete as
of 14 January 1969. Several critical parts, however, had not
been delivered on the scheduled dates, and it was expected
that continued slippage of the trainer RFT dates would ensue.
One component - the trainer digital computer - was delivered
one week earlier than promised, thereby eliminating a poten-
tially critical problem.
2. Acceleration Efforts
The timely delivery of aircraft parts and data was a
problem which persisted despite the progress which was being
made. Delays in the development of critical components of
the aircraft's avionic subsystems resulted in production de-
lays which impacted the WST schedule. The trainer contractors
were confronted with a number of Trainer Change Proposals
(TCP) stemming from aircraft Engineering Change Proposals
(ECP) as the aircraft design was modified during integration
of various avionic subsystems. An erroneous interpretation
45

of the aircraft data by Link required a design change by
Melpar to accommodate the tactics radar. The net effect of
the various problems and delays was an estimated RFT sched-
ule slippage to September and October 1969 for both Link and
Melpar.
A September RFT date for Unit #1 was unacceptable to
FMA-235 who directed that maximum effort be exerted to meet
a 1 August 1969 RFT date. During the Progress Status Review
Meeting held in February 1969, Melpar was asked to investi-
gate the possibility of improving the delivery of A-7E WST,
Unit #1, in order to achieve an RFT date of 1 August 1969.
Melpar* s reply stated that a 1 August RFT date was
achievable subject to agreement on certain conditions. NTEC
immediately advised AIR-04 of the proposed plan, the calcu-
lated risk of operating a partially completed integrated WST,
the probability that meeting the RFT date was marginal, and
that the operating performance was questionable. (It was
the intent of the Navy to derive the maximum pilot training
available from a partially completed trainer, while the con-
tractors completed their performance on a time sharing basis
with the user activities.) Melpar' s plan was forwarded by
AIR-04 to PMA-235 who approved the proposed acceleration ef-
fort and authorized the use of funds to implement the pro-
posed plan. (See EXHIBITS (VI-4) and (VI-5).) On 2g March
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a schedule acceleration with an RFT date of 1 August 1969
for A-7E WST, Unit #1.
Throughout the remainder of the program, contractor
performance was monitored in detail on a day-by-day basis.
Although substantial progress had been made by the end of
May, it appeared that Melpar would not be able to meet the
revised schedule. Technical problems in debugging the com-
puter program accounted for most of the slippage. Inade-
quate planning caused Melpar to frequently solicit technical
clarification and guidance from NTEC. In many instances,
Melpar' s requests for clarification were submitted too late
for NTEC to respond in sufficient time for the contractor to
meet an action due date. Their performance frustrated by
technical and managerial obstacles resulted in some Melpar
personnel leaving the project. Delays, non-productive efforts
and increased costs ensued. As problems mounted, the man-
agement of American Standards, Inc., the parent company, be-
came more involved in project decisions. Notwithstanding
Melpar' s apparent slippage, both contractors contended that
the RFT dates would be met.
3. Installation Problems
Throughout June, Link remained on schedule, but Mel-
par acknowledged that they were approximately two weeks be-
hind schedule. In July 1969, Link shipped the tactics por-
tion of the trainer to NAS Lemoore. Government in-plant
tests of the flight portion, started in mid-July at Melpar,
were suspended at the end of the month. It was evident that
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the goal of achieving a 1 August RFT date by means of accel-
eration efforts had been abrogated. Melpar was directed to
correct numerous deficiencies and inoperable systems before
Government testing could continue.
In-plant Government testing at Melpar was resumed
the following month. Although there existed a number of
performance deficiencies, the flight section of the trainer
was shipped to NAS Lemoore with the understanding that the
major deficiencies would be corrected prior to a 29 Septem-
ber 1969 RFT date. At this point, effort was being diverted
from Unit #2 of the flight section to prevent further sched-
ule slippage of Unit #1.
Progress at the installation site was plagued by
technical problems and two accidents. On 2 September, a fire
in the cable trenches destroyed some cables, and on 1&
September, employees of a Melpar subcontractor damaged addi-
tional cables when gun-driven studs passed through the false
flooring which was being installed. A major revision to the
IBM data was received by Melpar on 12 September which sub-
stantially changed the nature of the simulation. Although
the impact of the data revision on the RFT dates could not
be determined, 20 October 1969 and 24 March 1970 became the
estimated RFT dates.
Government testing of the now integrated flight and
tactics portions began in mid-October and continued through
10 November. The performance of the trainer was not
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acceptable due to several systems being essentially inoper-
able and to a substantial number of discrepancies in other
systems. Link encountered serious technical problems in the
tactics portion including details of some radar operating
modes, aircraft parts failures, electrical noise, NADIR
elevation, and optics problems. It -was decided that train-
ing on the tactics section was not feasible at that time.
In spite of the performance deficiencies, it was determined
that some training could be accomplished with the flight sec-
tion. Consequently, after discussions among NTEC, NAVAIR
and the user activities, it was decided that the flight sec-
tion would be made available for training on a 40 hour per
week basis. Additional contractor effort to complete the
trainer was rescheduled so as not to interfere with training.
Due to the effort and the materials diverted from Unit #2 to
Unit #1, the schedule for Unit #2 slipped approximately three
to six weeks as new estimated RFT dates were established.
The completion dates for the flight sections of both
Units #1 and #2 slipped an additional three weeks due to mal-
functions in the digital computer on Unit #2 in early
December. The plan of operation was for the Unit #2 compu-
ter to be used in-plant for debugging portions of the compu-
ter program needed to complete both trainers. Efforts to
complete radar simulation in the tactics section met with
similar lack of success.
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The absence of adequate progress caused NTEC to meet
with top level management of Link and Melpar in early-
December. The intent was to assess the project schedule,
to establish realistic completion dates which could be met,
and to solicit assurance of full company commitment to the
revised schedule. On 18 December 1969, a revised schedule
was submitted to CNO and NAVAIR.
Throughout January 1970 and into February, Link con-
tinued to have problems with the radar simulation. Melpar
lost two weeks on Unit #1 due to problems with the Direct
Memory Access. Additional Melpar effort was necessitated
when parts of the cockpit motion system were inadvertently
discarded by Navy personnel at NAS Lemoore. Correction of
deficiencies noted in testing had slipped to 13 February and
revised RFT dates of 10 April 1970 and 14 July 1970 were set.
Due to Melpar' s poor technical performance, the
correction of deficiencies noted in November 1969 were not
corrected until 21 March 1970. Subsequent Government test-
ing revealed unsatisfactory correction of some deficiencies
as well as uncovering others. The use of incorrect data
for simulation of the Navigation/Weapon Delivery Computer
by Melpar and similar examples of less than optimum perform-
ance caused further schedule slippages to 22 June and 25
August. Before Government testing could resume in June,
Melpar encountered substantial technical difficulties with
the cockpit motion system. Link resolved their major
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technical problem (NADIR elevation); however, both contract-
ors were required to perform additional work following
Government testing of Unit #1 in June 1970.
In September 1970, Unit #2 was delivered to NAS
Cecil Field. Although installation of the WST was hampered
by an incompleted facility, training commenced in late
November. The technical difficulties remaining after in-
stallation of both units of Device 2F&4B were not resolved
to the complete satisfaction of the Government. Eventually,
the existing deficiencies were corrected - some by Navy
maintenance personnel - thereby enabling formal acceptance
,
of the training devices by the Government on 25 August 1971.
Approximately four years elapsed during the interval
(1967-1971) in which planning was initiated for procurement
of A-7E WST's; and fully operational, discrepancy-free train-
ers became available for Navy use. The initial requirement
for March 1969 and May 1969 RFT dates was promptly super-
seded by a series of schedule slippages and related occur-
rences that deny the possibility of identifying the actual
RFT dates realized in this procurement.
F. CONTRACTUAL EFFORTS
1. Scope
On 2 May 1968, Change Order P009 to Contract N61339-
66-C-0220 was issued to Melpar and Change Order P007 to Con-
tract N61339-66-C-0221 was issued to Link providing direc-
tion to modify and update two A-7A WST's to the A-7E
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configuration. Within a few months, both contractors began
to experience contractual difficulties paralleled by techni-
cal problems. Contractual efforts were focused on negotia-
tions with: a.) LTV for provision of aircraft data and
parts, b.) IBM for proprietory computer (math model) data,
and c.) NTEC for definitization of the Government issued
contract change orders.
Contractual hurdles were initially caused by the
lack of firm aircraft specifications and a paucity of related
data. As data was incrementally received and analyzed, areas
were uncovered which indicated that more data, additional
costs, and increased contractor effort would be required.
This dilemma hampered an early definition and resolution of
contractual agreements. Nevertheless, by December 196&, con-
tractual accord had been reached with LTV and IBM for the
necessary data and aircraft parts. Subsequent to negotia-
tions conducted in November and December, Link definitized
Change Order P007 on 11 December 1963 by signing a fixed
price incentive contract which stated a target price of
$1,460,500. Attempts to achieve a firm contractual agree-
ment between Melpar and the Government, however, developed
into an interminable six year effort - an effort exacerbated
by managerial and personnel disruptions wrought within the
Melpar Corporation.
2. Change Order P009
The potentiality for contractual difficulties with
Melpar surfaced early in the A-7E WST Project. On 7 June
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1968, Melpar's parent company, Westinghouse Air Brake Com-
pany, merged with American Standards, Inc. In a late re-
sponse to the issuance of Change Order P009, Melpar, in early
July, offered the Government a Delta Change proposal which
had been due for submission on 15 June. Melpar attributed
the delay in proposal submission to the disruption in manage-
ment caused by the merger and a subsequent loss of key per-
sonnel associated with the A-7 WST Project. Following re-
ceipt of the contractor's Delta proposal by the Contracting
Officer, considerable effort ensued in an attempt to reach
preliminary contractual accord. In August 1968, Melpar sub-
mitted a revised proposal based on additional information
obtained regarding the A-7E aircraft.
A reticent stance engendered by Melpar permeated the
contractual history of the A-7E WST Project. A reluctance
to negotiate was initially demonstrated in early December,
when Melpar requested that contract negotiations scheduled
for mid-December be postponed due to program changes they
claimed were beyond their control. However, since the Pre-
Negotiation Clearance had been submitted and approved, NTEC
considered it to be in the best interest of the Navy to
^A Delta proposal is a contractor's formal reply to a
Government issued contract change order. It becomes the
basis, along with Government estimates, for the formulation
and negotiation of a supplemental agreement. A supplemental
agreement, when fully executed, connotes a contractual modi-
fication mutually agreed upon by both parties.
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conduct negotiations and to definitize Change Order P009,
which was then outstanding for more than seven months.
During negotiations on 17 December 1968, Melpar
requested that a Memorandum of Understanding be prepared
and attached to the Certificate of Current Cost and Pricing
Data. The purpose of this memorandum was to establish a
period for which Melpar would submit an add-on proposal from
a cut-off date of 30 August 1968 through the conclusion of
negotiations on 19 December 1968. Melpar 1 s request was
honored and a Memorandum of Understanding was accepted by
NTEC. Despite this contractual acquiescence by the Govern-
ment, subsequent negotiations with Melpar became necessary.
The contract with Melpar consisted of three lots:
a. Lot I pertained to the basic procurement.
b. Lot II covered movement of one of the trainers
from MCAS Beaufort to the Pentagon for a firm fixed price.
c. Lot III established the update of Lot I units
from A-7A (flight section) to an A-7E configuration under a
fixed price incentive basis.
Supplemental Agreement P013, drawn up by NTEC, pro-
posed an equitable adjustment to the contract price for con-
tractor performance on Lot III as well as an adjustment for
the impact of Change Order P009 on (the incompleted portion
of) Lot I.
In January 1969, Melpar submitted credit proposals
for Lot I contract items (items not completed on A-7A WST,
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Unit #4). The credit proposals v/hich should have been made
available for negotiation in December were negotiated on 4,
5 and 6 February 1969. The Post Negotiation Clearance was
submitted to the Chief of Naval Material on 14 February and
approved on 27 February.
In order to expedite the execution of Supplemental
Agreement P013, an advance copy was forwarded to Melpar in
early March 1969. Repeated efforts were made by NTEC to ex-
pedite return of the Supplemental Agreement. Executed by
Melpar on 29 April, it was returned accompanied by a letter
citing thirty-six exceptions to the schedule and the speci-
fication for Device 2F$4B relative to intent and language.
(It should be noted that the contractor had the specifica-
tion in his possession since Change Order P009 was issued on
2 May 1968, after which numerous clarification conferences
were held. The specification and schedule were discussed
and reviewed with contractor representatives during contract
negotiations and prior to preliminary distribution of the
Supplemental Agreement. At this time, few, if any, minor
differences had been voiced by Melpar.) The thirty-six ex-
ceptions became the subject of numerous subsequent meetings
with various contractor personnel and were all eventually
resolved. Supplemental Agreement P013 was fully executed on
10 July 1969 and reflected a bilaterally agreed to price for
all requirements except for the period from 30 August 1968
through 19 December 1963.
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3. Change Order P014
The schedule slippages experienced in the A-7E WST
Project were translated into the contractual realm in March
1969 when Change Order P013 was issued to Link and Change
Order P014 was issued to Melpar directing a schedule accelera-
tion for WST, Unit #1. In response to the Change Order, a
Delta proposal for acceleration and add-on contractor effort
was submitted by Link in May and definitized through negotia-
tions conducted in October. In June, Melpar provided addi-
tional information to support the Delta proposal that had
been submitted the previous month. On 1& August, Melpar
withdrew their proposal for acceleration and add-on effort
by stating:
Examination of the subject proposal, in light of events
which have transpired since its submission, indicate
significant omissions in the data presented and the
need for considering additional items within the con-
text of both acceleration and post-August matters.
Subject proposal is therefore non-valid and is with-
drawn pending further review and correction.
°
Melpar again demonstrated a reluctance to resolve con-
tractual matters in October 1969, when they advised NTEC
that it was also their intent to withdraw the proposal sub-
mitted covering their contractual efforts performed prior to
or beyond 30 August 1968. In reply, the Government Contract-
ing Officer advised Melpar that withdrawal of both proposals
U.S. Naval Training Equipment Center, Procurement Ser-
vices Department Files, A-7 Weapon System Trainer file




and a subsequent untimely resubmission would adversely impact
negotiations and deleteriously effect profit considerations.
An explicit detailed explanation of the situation was re-
quested from Melpar.
Contending that costs for the acceleration Change
Order could not be segregated, Melpar resubmitted proposals
increasing in aggregate amounts on 23 November 1969 and on
12 January 1970. The cost allocations, contained therein,
were lump sum dollar estimates. The Contracting Officer
determined the proposals and the cost exhibits later for-
warded by Melpar to be in noncompliance with accepted Govern-
ment cost justification guidelines. The Contracting Officer
reemphasized the need for detailed back-up cost data.
On 10 February, the Government negotiator telephoned
Melpar for the cost data, which Melpar had promised to sub-
mit on 5 February. He was told that "Melpar was going in
circles in an attempt to resolve how the costs could be ap-
9portioned to the cost factors requested by the Government." 7
The only solution known to Melpar was to use the services of
personnel working on Unit #2, which was not desirable based
on the recognized urgency to meet the RFT date for Unit #1.
Effort to date had consisted of personnel not directly re-
lated to the A-7 project attempting to achieve a contractual







In late February 1970, in an attempt to resolve
Melpar's problems, a meeting was convened by the management
of American Standard, Inc. (ASI). This meeting was inter-
rupted in order to permit Melpar personnel to participate in
an interview with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
concerning the subject proposal.
The DCAA Audit Report was received by NTEC in early
March. In the report, the audit team questioned $559,015 of
the contractor's proposed non-incentive costs for lack of
supporting documentation. Melpar's proposed costs-to-complete
were supported by lump sum estimates for each line item, e.g.
Maintenance, Augmented Support, Repair Parts, Maintenance
Kits, Aircraft Parts and Data, etc. It was not possible for
the audit team to adequately evaluate the proposed amounts
since they had not been segregated by component element, i.e.
labor, overhead, and other direct/indirect costs. Based up-
on a review of the audit report which demonstrated the con-
tractor's failure to segregate costs, the local Government
Cost Advisor recommended that Lot III of the contract be
converted to a firm fixed price settlement.
In April, estimated allocations for the cost impact
areas in the January 1970 proposal were again submitted by
Melpar, but these were also determined to be inadequate by
NTEC. To ensure that the Government's request for cost in-
formation was understood, a Clarification Conference was
held at the contractor's plant on 29 and 30 April 1970. The
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information made available to the NTEC representatives at
this time was minimal. Melpar alleged that in order to pro-
vide the requested details, it would be necessary to divert
personnel from the project and further delay the RFT date.
In June 1970, based on a preliminary engineering
estimate, the Contracting Officer made a settlement offer
of $350,000 which was rejected by the management of ASI.
Subsequent to the Government's offer, Melpar agreed to at-
tend another Clarification Conference. At this meeting,
Melpar agreed to provide further clarifying cost data. This
information was not received by the Government until the
first incremental submittal was provided by ASI on 27 January
1972 - 2-g- years later. Three successive incremental sub-
mittals followed in letters of 30 May 1972, 6 September 1972,
and 23 December 1972.
4. A Novation Agreement
Melpar experienced another disruption in management
and a subsequent loss of personnel after negotiations com-
menced in May 1970 between American Standard, Inc., and
Reflectone, Inc., a subsidiary of the Otis Elevator Company.
The negotiations focused on the sale of the Melpar Simula-
tion Department to Reflectone. In June, the Contracting Of-
ficer received confirmation of the intended sale, and a copy
of a Novation Agreement was forwarded to NTEC in September.
According to the terms of the Novation Agreement executed on
24 August 1970, Reflectone assumed all responsibility for
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continued performance under Contract N61339-66-C-0220. (A
separate agreement between ASI and Reflectone was estab-
lished to settle the equitable adjustment of the contract.)
In separate letters, NTEC was advised by ASI of their in-
tent to pursue the successful settlement of the contract,
and by Reflectone that they would be completing performance
under the contract.
Despite the fact that the major technical hurdles
had already been overcome in the A-7E WST Project, the Con-
tracting Officer's immediate response was to issue a "show
cause" letter requesting ASI to explain why the contract
should not be terminated for default. The Contractor's
letter response stated in part:
The contract cannot be terminated for default because
there are, at this time, no legally binding RFT dates
or schedule; ...mutually acceptable and realistic RFT
dates must be based on consideration by both parties
of all factors affecting our performance. 10
5. Settlement Offers
A meeting was convened at NTEC on 29 September 1970
for the purpose of discussing and resolving, if possible, all
existing contractual problems. The Contractor's claim re-
vised upward to $2
.
3M was rejected by the Contracting Officer
stating that a settlement based on total costs incurred was
non-negotiable. Up to this point in time, any attempt to






futile. The Government's settlement offer based on engineer-
ing estimates and expertise in the A-7 program was rejected
by ASI.
In further attempts to settle by negotiation during
the succeeding year, five separate Government proposals, in-
creasing in amount and based on information amplifying the
preliminary engineering estimate, were offered. All were
rejected by ASI. The impasse led the Contracting Officer to
notify ASI in October 1971 that there was no recourse but to
make a unilateral determination as to a fair and reasonable
price adjustment.
Following a series of conferences and exchanges of
correspondence, two of four submissions of technical dis-
cussion and justification, as well as cost data to support
pricing, were provided by ASI by June 1972. The major por-
tion of the supporting data still remained to be submitted.
Since the Government's "final" offer of $1.35M was rejected
in May 1972 and ASI was unwilling to settle for less than
$1.73M on a total cost basis, the Contracting Officer issued
a unilateral determination on 30 June 1972 in the amount of
$0.SM.
6. ASBCA Appeal
On 3 August 1972, ASI appealed to the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA). Discussion during a pre-
hearing on 6 February 1973 centered around Supplemental
Agreement P013, negotiations thereof, and the Memorandum of
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Understanding attached to the Certificate of Current Cost
and Pricing Data. The Board member advised the appellant
that to prove that P013 was simply a funding action (which
was the appellant's contention) would be difficult. ASI,
directed by the Board Member to file an amended complaint by
20 February 1973, did so on g March 1973.
A subsequent delay, caused by the appellant's coun-
sel becoming a member of the Board, was instrumental in both
parties agreeing that an out-of-court settlement should again
be attempted. On 20 August 1973, the Board issued an order
of dismissal removing the appeal from the ASBCA Docket with-
out prejudice to its reinstatement, should the parties not
be able to reach a settlement.
7. Contract Settlements
Contractual agreements with Link were finalized in
April 1973 following the issuance of additional contract
change orders and the satisfactory resolution of a claim
submitted by the contractor in 1971. The claim for addi-
tional costs owed to Link was based on delays in delivery
and failure of aircraft hardware and other factors which the
contractor claimed were beyond his control. The Contracting
Officer, however, asserted that a significant impact on the
cost areas specified by Link had been caused by the negligence
and fault of Link's co-contractor. After considerable dis-
cussion, Link accepted the negotiator's position, and an
equitable adjustment was agreed upon by both parties.
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In September 1973, ASI submitted a collation of all
of its claims under the Melpar contract, which was an at-
tempt to cross-reference all associated costing or pricing
previously submitted. Nevertheless, despite subsequent
correspondence and negotiations, it was determined by March
1974 that ASI had not provided sufficient information to the
Government.
Confronted by an indeterminable date for ASI's sub-
mission to support their claim, the last being submitted in
December 1972, the Government made a final attempt at
negotiated settlement. The negotiation approach that was
considered, in effect, closed out the entire contract and
converted the incentive portions to fixed price amounts,
thereby settling all claims for a total contract price. Af-
ter a series of offers and counter-offers were made during
negotiations on 2 May 1974, a final agreement of $1,234,235
was reached increasing the total contract price to $6.SM.
G. ACQUISITION ANALYSIS
The management decisions relating to the procurement of
Device 2F&4B were encapsulated by the requirement to obtain
weapon system trainers on an urgent basis. The following
analysis is presented in an attempt to assess the factors
which brought about the problems which caused the trainer
project to be late in meeting its schedule.
The requirement for Device 2F34B was somewhat unique in
that determination came about in mid-stream of the aircraft
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program rather than during program initiation. The planning
time frame which led to a contractual commitment for procure-
ment of the first A-7E aircraft was approximately eleven
months in duration (May 1967 to March 1963). This abbrevi-
ated planning phase precluded an adequate assessment of all
essential program considerations in terms of engineering de-
sign, integrated logistic support, and trainer contract award
and administration as indicated by the following: s
1. It was acknowledged that firm aircraft specifications
had not been established for the A-7E, nevertheless the deci-
sion to immediately procure weapon system trainers was made.
It is readily apparent that the Navy, the aircraft manufactur-
er, and the trainer contractors underestimated the technical
risk involved. The A-7E aircraft was considered to be simply
a refined version of previous A-7 models, when in reality the
development and integration of the avionics subsystems proved
to be a significant departure from previous effort. As a
result, many early decisions were made without adequate as-
sessment of their potential impact on the trainer development
effort. For example:
a. The degree of effort required to update the A-7A
WST's to the A-7E configuration, in lieu of the estimated ef-
fort to fabricate new devices, proved to be of greater magni-
tude than initially envisioned.
b. The determination that an A-7E WST could be de-
signed, fabricated and installed in nine months when it was
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known that the minimum time in which aircraft parts and
critical data would initially become available was six
months.
c. The establishment of a WST RFT date approxi-
mately concurrent with the aircraft IOC date. It was not
recognized that the pacing factor in a training device pro-
ject is the aircraft program itself. Trainer development
under the selected method of procurement must sequentially
follow development of the aircraft, and an additional time
lag necessitated by delivery of parts and data must be re-
cognized.
d. The degree of effort required in clarifying
technical specifications and requirements initially con-
sidered to be adequate for design purposes.
2. The compressed schedule of the Device 2F34B project
resulted in contractual decisions that proved to be exceed-
ingly difficult to administer and troublesome to resolve.
For example:
a. The decision to abbreviate the procurement ad-
ministration lead-time by issuing Change Orders P007 to Link
and P009 to Melpar rather than issuing new contracts. It is
DOD policy not to have production equipment (e.g. A-7A WST,
Unit #3), that has been delivered and accepted, reworked
under a change to the production contract. Instead, a new
contract is issued for the rework.
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b. Change Orders P007 and P009 were issued without
being contractually priced or subject to an established ceil-
ing. Resolution of the contract with Melpar was an intermin-
able six year effort after issuance of Change Order P009.
c. The decision to contract on a fixed price incen-
tive basis with Melpar. A prerequisite to the issuance of
a FPI contract is the assurance that the contractor's ac-
counting system adequately provides for the allocation of
costs so that the necessary cost data will be available for
a final negotiation of profit. It appears that a contractual
dilemma existed. The deficiencies in Melpar' s accounting
system warranted the use of a firm fixed price contract;
however, recourse to this type of contract would have been
inappropriate due to the lack of firm, definitized WST
specifications.
d. The failure of the Navy to establish and adhere
to firm RFT dates to which the contractors could be held
liable. Repeated changes of RFT dates negated the Contract-
ing Officer's option to terminate the contract for default
for reasons of delinquency in delivery.
e. The decision to commence training using a partial-
ly completed trainer, in effect, committed the Navy to ac-
cepting the device regardless of its ultimate performance
capabilities or lack thereof.
3. The procurement of Device 2F84B was not planned as
an integrated element of the Integrated Logistic Support
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Plan. Instead, the view was held that acquisition of train-
ing devices are isolated procurements whose end products,
upon acceptance by the Navy, are to be added as training
support to the aircraft program. This rationale was demon-
strated in the following examples:
a. The relationship of the aircraft manufacturer
and subcontractors to the trainer contractors was not identi-
fied. Link and Melpar were dependent upon the support of
LTV and IBM; however, in the absence of contractual rela-
tionships, LTV and IBM had no obligation to respond for rea-
sons other than their own interest in a successful program.
b. Supply support during trainer development was
not adequately addressed as evidenced by the parts reliabi-
lity problem and long lead-time experienced by Link and
Melpar in obtaining replacement parts.
c. The opportunity to establish realistic work
breakdown structures by Link and Melpar was negated by the
late and intermittent availability of aircraft and computer
data.
d. The involvement of the A-7 ILS Manager in the
planning, coordination and direction provided to the trainer
project was not evident. PMA-235 was the principal interface
between the project office and other principals involved.
4. Every program/acquisition manager should anticipate
the occurrences of "unknowns" which may detrimentally influ-
ence the success of a project. In the case of the acquisition
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of Device 2F34B, many "unknowns" were provided by the con-
tractors as evidenced by:
a. The loss of key contractor personnel associated
with the A-7 WST Project as a consequence of the merger of
Melpar's parent company, Westinghouse Air Brake Company,
with American Standard, Inc. In the development of training
devices, such personnel losses may significantly impair a
contractor's ability to perform under a specific contract.
b. The less than desired progress achieved by
Melpar and Link during project acceleration and subsequent
trainer integration.
c. The reluctance/inability of Melpar to provide
cost data in a format suitable for timely contract resolu-
tion.
H. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PROCUREMENT
1. An approved Navy Training Plan is the official state-
ment of personnel and training requirements to support the
introduction and operational use of new systems, equipments
and other developments. If an NTP is to be a viable instru-
ment relative to the acquisition of aviation training de-
vices, there exists a need for the establishment of RFT dates
in consonance with reasonable trainer procurement lead-times.
It appears that RFT dates are currently established based
solely on operational needs, and the schedule for the train-
er acquisition program must then be structured accordingly.
A common consequence is a compressed schedule characterized
70

by late and inadequate planning, which detrimentally influ-
ences program implementation. To aid in avoiding the con-
flicts and problems experienced in past trainer procurements,
the requirements determination process should identify RFT
dates and authorize training device procurement as early as
possible and in accordance with the planning time frame
specified in OPNAVINST 1500. SG. If DOD Directive 5000.1 is
to be implemented in training device acquisition, military
planners must consider procurement lead-time in addition to
the need and urgency of Fleet operational requirements, so
that practical and meaningful tradeoffs between trainer capa-
bility, cost and schedule may be implemented.
2. DOD Directive 5000.1 directs consideration of logis-
tic support as a principal design parameter in the acquisi-
tion of weapon systems. If the ILS concept is to receive
proper emphasis within aircraft weapon system programs, it
is imperative that the project office functionally reflect
these changing perspectives relative to training device ac-
quisition. The organizational focal point for decision mak-
ing and tradeoff analysis for logistic support is the ILS
Manager. Successful ILS planning and execution requires his
active participation and cognizance over all elements of
logistic support including the acquisition of training de-
vices.
3. It has been noted that planning for the acquisition
of training devices in an isolated manner divorced from the
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weapon system logistic support effort hinders efficient and
timely procurement. A current Navy objective, as stated in
NAVMATINST 4000. 20A, is to "...provide for an orderly, sys-
tematic method to determine, in an integrated manner, the
requirement for logistic support resources." The translation
of the need for training devices into the weapon system ILSP,
in an integrated manner, demands a dynamic planning process
iterative in nature. These iterations necessitate, not only
the planning effort for training device procurement taking
into account the implications of those decisions that inter-
relate with the total ILS effort, but also require formulat-
ing the ILSP so as to incorporate the trainer procurement
effort. Specific guidance identifying this iterative process
is delineated in NAVMATINST 4000. 20A in terms of documenta-
tion, requirements to be met, assignment of responsibilities,
etc. Ideally, the inputs to the NTP, including those relat-
ing to procurement of trainers, should be considered by all
cognizant project personnel on an iterative basis and be
incorporated in all relevant planning documents (e.g.,
Development Proposals, Advanced Procurement Plans, Request
for Proposals, Project Master Plans, etc). Opportunities
for practical and meaningful tradeoffs in terms of cost,
schedule and trainer capabilities will then be enhanced and
the ramifications of related decisions such as contractor




VII. EPILOGUE: DEVICE 2F111 PROJECT HISTORY
A. PRECONTRACT PHASE, A-7E WST, UNIT #3
The requirement for A-7E WST, Units #3 and #4, identified
at the time the Navy decided to buy the A-7E aircraft in
1967, was reinstated in the Weapon System Planning Document
of 13 February 1969. The Navy's original intent had been to
issue Letter Contracts to Melpar, Inc., and the Link Group,
General Precision Systems, Inc., who were currently perform-
ing under contract for design and fabrication of A-7E WST,
Units #1 and #2. However, the lack of satisfactory progress
on Units #1 and #2 led to a temporary withdrawal of the re-
quirement for additional weapon system trainers.
The need for a second A-7E WST with a RFT date of 1 July
1974 to be sited at NAS Lemoore was again identified in a
CNO message of September 1972. NTEC responded to the require-
ment by proposing a competitive procurement with subsequent
contract award by late fourth quarter, FY73. NAVAIR (AIR-04),
however, recommended sole source procurement with LTV, the
Aircraft Prime Contractor, for the following reasons:
1. An abbreviated procurement lead-time could be a-
chieved by award of contract to LTV prior to 31 December 1972.
The obligational authority of funds already programmed for
WST procurement would expire on that date and subsequent
budget submittals would be necessary.
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2. The administration lead-time required for a competi-
tive procurement could jeopardize meeting the stated RFT
date by not allowing ample contractor lead-time.
3. An estimated savings of $1M could be achieved from
spillover of LTV's engineering efforts in developing the
Night Carrier Landing Trainer and the availability of the
IBM math model and essential test equipment.
4. WST design was to provide for future incorporation
of TRAM (Target Recognition Attack Multisensors) , a series
of state-of-the-art multisensors permitting a night weapons
delivery accuracy for the A-7E comparable to visual daylight
delivery accuracy. LTV had recently been awarded Contract
N00019-72-C-0627 for development of TRAM.
5. The lessons learned from procurement of Device 2F8/+.B
and additional justifications stated in NAVAIR D&F No.
5013-032-3, dated 20 December 1972 (See Exhibit (VII-1)
supported sole source procurement.
FMA-235 concurred with the recommendation for sole
source procurement and on 27 September 1972 a Procurement
Request was submitted to Vought Systems Division (VSD) , LTV
Aerospace Corporation. Following negotiations and approval
of the Business Clearance in mid-December, an agreement was
signed with VSD on 27 December 1972. Modification No.
P00026 to the A-7 aircraft production contract - Contract
N00019-72-C-09£3 - stipulated a firm fixed price of $5.2M





Authority to Negotiate an Individual Contract
NAVAIR D&F No. 5013-032-3
Upon the basis of the following findings and determination
which I hereby make as Agency Head, the proposed contract de-
scribed below may be negotiated without formal advertising
pursuant to the authority of 10 U.S.C. 2302 (a) (14).
Findings
1. The Naval Air Systems Command proposes to procure by nego-
tiation one (1) A-7E weapon system trainer together with re-
lated supplies and services consisting of design data, final
corrected data, engineering drawings, publications, Navy
site, training program for Navy personnel, provisioning and
interim spare parts and repair parts. This weapon system
trainer will realistically simulate all flight and tactics
parameters peculiar to the A-7E aircraft and will be used
for flight instruction of Navy pilots transitioning into
A-7E Squadrons. The weapon system trainer is deemed to be
of a technical or special nature within the meaning of para-
graph 3-214 of the Armed Service Procurement Regulation.
2. Procurement by negotiation of the above described equip-
ment is necessary because the manufacture of this trainer
by any supplier other than Vought Aerospace Corporation
would result in duplication of the necessary preparation
which would unduly delay the procurement of the equipment.
Likewise, the equipment is so specialized and complicated
that its manufacture requires a substantial initial invest-
ment and if manufactured by any supplier other than Vought
Aerospace Corporation would duplicate high starting costs
already borne by the Government for related training equip-
ment produced by Vought Aerospace. The manufacture of the
weapon system trainer requires detailed familarity with the
design of the A-7E aircraft and math-modeling of the IBM
computer utilized in the aircraft. Vought Aerospace Corp-
oration has recently been awarded Contract N00019-72-C-0627
for development of TRAM (Target Recognition Attack Multi-
sensors), a series of "state-of-the-art" multisensors wnich
will permit aircraft to fly night as well as day missions.
The weapon system trainer will incorporate provisions for
TRAM. Time consuming physical preparation and extensive
production engineering will be minimized by acquiring the
trainer from Vought Aerospace Corporation due to contractual
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A-7E aircraft simulators produced by Vought Aerospace Corp-
oration. Starting costs such as preliminary engineering and
development of simulation techniques and other manufacturing
preparations by Vought Aerospace Corporation, the developer
of similar A-7E aircraft simulation equipment, have been re-
covered by the contractor under other Government contracts.
Generally, this work would not be useful to or usable by any
other supplier. Therefore, manufacture of this trainer by
any other supplier would result in a duplication of these
costs and would likely result in additional costs to the
Government by reason of such duplication. Deliveries of the
weapon system trainer and related supplies and services are
required to commence in August 1974 and be completed in
December 1974. Vought Aerospace Corporation has acquired
the special skills, manufacturing techniques and experience
necessary to manufacture this equipment and can meet the re-
quired delivery schedule. No other supplier possessing the
special skills and experience necessary to manufacture accept-
able equipment in time to meet the delivery schedule is
known. Accordingly, manufacture by any supplier other than
Vought Aerospace Corporation would require an extended period
of preparation for manufacture which would delay delivery of
the equipment. Similarly, the ability of Vought Aerospace
Corporation, as the prime aircraft contractor, to make im-
portant aircraft design provisions in the trainer (such as
TRAM) will enhance future trainer operations by minimizing
subsequent design change engineering efforts and optimizing
both future change production and cost goals.
3. The Vought Aeronautics Corporation, Dallas, Texas, which
designed and developed the A-7 series aircraft, has demon-
strated the technical knowledge and expertise necessary to
design and fabricate an A-7E Weapon System Trainer. The
manufacture of production aircraft and simulators to support
those aircraft necessitates detailed familiarity with the
aircraft design and specifications, extensive production
engineering and physical preparation, all of which can only
be acquired through previous design, development or produc-
tion effort conducted by the manufacturer. The Vought Aero-
nautics Corporation, under Naval Air Systems Command contract
N00019-6S-C-0075, has successfully designed, fabricated and
delivered two (2) A-7E "Night Carrier Landing Trainers" simu-
lators (2F103) which are presently being utilized by the
Fleet. The proposed A-7E "Weapon System Trainer" will in-
corporate approximately 90$ of the design characteristics of
the "Night Carrier Landing Trainer" and will retain approxi-
mately oOfo hardware commonality. The proposed A-7E WST will
incorporate the actual computer, thus permitting the utiliza-
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simulator. This new motivative concept will negate the cost-
ly and time consuming task of reprogramming the simulator
after each subsequent change in the aircraft software pro-
gram. The Vought Aeronautics Corporation is the only known
contractor who has successfully integrated the TC-2 aircraft
computer with A-7E Weapons Delivery System. This integra-
tion will be accomplished in the proposed A-7E WST and will
generated complete systems compatability. This proposed con-
cept will reduce future logistics cost and will enhance the
configuration control process by reducing necessary lead
time, deleting duplication of engineering effort (such as
drawings, parts cataloging, etc.) and will standardize, to
some degree, those parts required in the Navy inventory.
Therefore, contracting with LTV for the proposed WST will
(1) optimize Government time to contract award; (2) reduce
the WST design and fabrication time frame; (3) substantially
reduce initial WST support costs; (4) reduce follow-on A-7E
WST costs for accommodating aircraft changes; and (5) meet
Fleet delivery requirements while optimizing acquisition
costs.
4. Use of formal advertising for procurement of the above
described equipment is impracticable because such method
may result in procurement from another source which would
require duplication of necessary initial investment and prep-
aration to produce this equipment and would likely result
in additional cost to the Government and delay the procure-
ment of this equipment by reason of such duplication.
Determination
The proposed contract is for equipment of a technical or
specialized nature which requires a substantial initial
investment and an extended period of preparation for manu-
facture, and procurement thereof by formal advertising
would likely result in additional cost to the Government by
reason of duplication of investment and result in duplication
of necessary preparation of which would unduly delay the
procurement of the equipment.
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B. PRECONTRACT PHASE, A-7E WST, UNIT #4
The requirement for a second A-7E WST to be sited at NAS
Cecil Field was established by CNO in September 1973 and a
RFT date of 1 August 1975 was stipulated. NTEC was requested
to provide a lead-time estimate for a competitive procure-
ment. Based on actual contractor lead-time for the A-6 and
P-3 programs, the NTEC estimate was thirty-six months - a
twelve month contractual lead-time prior to award followed
by twenty-four months of contractor lead-time.
Rather than pursue a competitive procurement approach,
AIR-04 recommended that sole source procurement with VSD
would best serve cost, schedule and performance parameters
because:
1. VSD, under contract for delivery of A-7E WST Unit
#3, would save nine months in design effort because of prior
and current experience in building A-7 training devices.
Procurement from a source other than VSD would necessitate
an extended period of preparation and duplication of costs
and the substantial engineering design effort already in
progress.
2. LTV is the only source possessing a proven capabili-
ty of integrating the A-7E aircraft avionics to provide an
integral operational system - a feat expressly described as




3. The proposal of $3.7M by VSD is comparable to the
price of $5.2M negotiated for Unit #3. The $1.5M investment
cost savings primarily in the areas of engineering and
material are an addition to the $1M savings spillover from
development of the NCLT by VSD. The $3.7M proposal favor-
ably compared to NTEC's estimate of $7.SM and $5.2M for
procurement of two A-6 WST's - devices of similar complexity,
Contract negotiations conducted with VSD were concluded
on 25 January 1974. To condense the administrative lead-
time, the contractual vehicle was once again the A-7 produc-
tion contract - Contract N0019-73-C-0302. Supplemental
Agreement P00041 stipulated a Fixed Price Incentive Contract
with a target price of $3.9M and a ceiling price of $4.3M
for the second Device 2F111.
C. DEVELOPMENT PHASE
Based on the design specifications drawn up by VSD, the
major portions of Device 2F111 are being fabricated as sub-
contracted items. As a result of bids solicited by VSD from
the simulator industry, Honeywell is currently developing
the Radar Land Mass System; University Computing Company is
to provide computer and peripheral equipment; and Burtek
Inc. has been tasked with fabrication of the Flight Simula-
tion System, Instructor Station, Trainee Station and electri-
cal power supply. VSD' s primary engineering effort will oc-










An analysis of the A-7E Weapon System Trainer procure-
ments reveals in microcosm the changing scenario of weapon
system acquisition at large. By taking into account the
contemporary environment which gave birth to the A-7E train-
ers and by tracing through the problems and conflicts which
arose and the corrective action taken in subsequent procure-
ments, the effects of changing military acquisition policies
can be discerned.
The acquisition of Device 2F111 appears to be a case of
"lessons learned" from previous trainer acquisitions as well
as an application of the policy and program considerations
delineated in DOD Directive 5000.1. New perspectives are
being established in the acquisition of aircraft training
devices as evidenced by the rationale presented in Exhibit
(VTI-1) and by the following analysis of current policy and
practices:
1. With the increasing complexities of modern weapon
systems and the attendant realization of the worth of the
total ILS concept, it has become apparent that, in many
cases, more efficient and timely procurement can be achieved
by procuring training devices from the prime weapon system
contractor as a standard element of the total training pack-
age. From a managerial viewpoint, the concentration of
responsibility for training device development entrusted
to the prime contractor is the primary and most significant
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benefit to be derived. The resultant factors favorably-
supporting this method of procurement are:
a. Sole Source vs Competitive Procurement
Competition has always been the preferred method
of procurement for military supplies and services. The se-
lection of a prime contractor to develop a training device
for an associated weapon system, however, means sole source
procurement in regards to the trainer acquisition. Never-
theless, if the training device is viewed as an integral ele-
ment of the weapon system logistic support, then sole source
procurement with the prime contractor is justified. Few, if
any, prime contractors possess all of the specialized capa-
bilities needed for training device design, fabrication and
installation. By necessity, subcontractors from the simula-
tor industry furnish the majority of effort required. If
competition is to exist, it is at the subcontracting level
where its application can be directed.
b. Delivery Date
The probability of an "on schedule" delivery is
increased by dealing directly with the prime contractor since
concurrent initiation of effort on the weapon system and
the associated training device is possible. The parallel
development of the weapon system and the trainer under the
same contract reduces the administrative effort that is re-
quired to implement and to coordinate separate procurements,
and also provides a greater degree of scheduling flexibility.
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The prime contractor's pride and self-interest in successfully
accomplishing the "total" weapon system program is a motivat-




Contracting for the weapon system and training
devices from a single source 1) simplifies and expedites
funding actions, and 2) provides increased funding flexibi-
lity to effect essential reprogramming actions and tradeoffs
within total funding packages and time limits.
d. Cost
A precursory analysis would indicate that con-
tracting directly from the trainer industry would reduce the
costs of training device procurement. The savings accrue
from the reduction of the "middle man" management profit
realized by the prime contractor for his services in subcon-
tracting to the trainer industry. However, when viewed in
terms of a life cycle cost analysis, these savings are some-
what eroded by costs incurred due to such factors as 1) the
need to procure special consultant services, data, and sup-
ply support items from the prime contractor, and 2) histori-
cally demonstrated difficulties associated with the coordina-
tion of separate weapon system and trainer procurements
characterized by conflicts and delays, which eventually sur-




Maintaining a flow of technical data from the
weapon system development source to the trainer designer,
that is both timely and accurate, can best be achieved when
the contractor who is responsible for generating the data is
also responsible for the training device. Lines of communi-
cation are shortened, problems associated with the transfer
of proprietory information are eliminated, and the contract-
or having dual responsibility for the trainer and the data





Centralizing the responsibility for the trainer
and the weapon system parts and equipment required for the
trainer fabrication in the hands of the prime contractor
minimizes potential problems by 1) early identification of
long lead-time items, 2) incorporation of current equip-
ments into the trainer that match those ultimately installed
in the weapon system, 3) facilitating the establishment of
procedures to replace and/or repair failed components, and
4) minimizing purchase costs for weapon system components
by means of a single coordinated procurement.
g. Configuration Control
Contracting by the Principal Development Activi-
ty for Trainer Change Proposals (TCP), submitted by the
trainer industry as follow-on actions to weapon system
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Engineering Change Proposals (ECP), introduces administra-
tive lead-times that aggravate the lag of the trainer con-
figuration with that of the weapon system. These delays are
minimized when the prime contractor is responsible for the
weapon system and the training device. Engineering effort
for the weapon system and the trainer is performed simul-
taneously, and a TCP and an ECP can be processed as a single
document. Problems associated with the incorporation of
TCP's are further minimized by the coordinated parts and
data flow previously described.
2. Because of close association with the early develop-
ment of training devices for the Navy, NTEC historically has
been delegated the authority by NAVAIR to separately contract
for aviation training devices as well as to perform the
technical functions required. As a result of changing per-
spectives relating to training devices within a total ILS
concept, NAVAIR now does its own contracting, however, the
full services of NTEC are still utilized. NTEC project offi-
cers and engineering personnel perform the same functions,
and the services of the contracting personnel are still em-
ployed as cost analysts, negotiators, etc.
There exists a need to retain the expertise relating to
training devices as developed at NTEC a) for the technical
administration of trainer development, and b) as an alter-
nate contracting source for use when the prime weapon system
contractor's estimates are excessively high, or when he is
B5

not equipped or interested in handling the development and
production of training devices.
Naval Air Systems Command, Weapons Training Division
Memorandum for RADM T. R. McClellan, Operator Trainer Pro -




A-7E WST PROCUREMENT HISTORY
A. DEVICE 2FS4B: PROCUREMENT HISTORY
May 1967 Initiation of Program Change Request for procure-
ment of A-7E aircraft
Jun 1967 Requirement for Device 2F84, A-7A WST terminated.
Military Characteristics for A-7E WST approved
Jul 1967 A-7E Aircraft Program officially addressed in APP
#53-63
Oct 1967 Link and Melpar informed of Navy's intent to modi-
fy A-7A WST, Units #3 and #4, to the A-7E configura-
tion
Dec 1967 OSD approval for procurement of A-7E aircraft
Feb 1963 NTPC held. NTEC states the improbability of
achieving a March 1969 RFT date
May 1963 Contract Change Orders issued to Link and Melpar
directing modification of A-7A WST, Units #3 and
#4, to the A-7E configuration
Jun 1963 Westinghouse Air Brake Company merges with American
Standard, Inc.
Aug 1963 Clarification of proposals apparently completed
Sep 1968 Initial identification of parts and data problems
Oct 1963 Parts and Data Meeting. Decision to accept parti-
ally completed trainer to meet revised RFT date
Dec I96B FPI contract with Link established. Negotiations
with Melpar initiated
Feb 1969 Negotiations with Melpar resumed. WST development
problems cause RFT schedule slippage
Mar 1969 Supplement Agreement P013 forwarded to Melpar.
Change Orders directing schedule acceleration is-
sued to Link and Melpar
Apr 1969 Supplemental Agreement P013 executed but 36 excep-
tions cited by Melpar
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May 1969 Melpar and Link submit proposals for acceleration
effort
Jul 1969 Link delivers tactics portion to NAS Lemoore.
Government in-plant tests suspended at Melpar
plant
Aug 1969 Melpar delivers flight portion to NAS Lemoore.
Proposal for acceleration effort withdrawn by
Melpar
Sep 1969 Two accidents at installation site and a major re-
vision to IBM data cause schedule slippage
Oct 1969 Melpar notifies NTEC of intent to withdraw proposal
for initial and follow-on efforts. Contractual
accord with Link regarding acceleration Change
Order P013
Nov 1969 Aggregate Proposal of $1.2M submitted by Melpar.
Government testing of integrated WST suspended.
Training begins on partially completed trainer
Dec 1969 Meeting with Melpar and Link to assess project
schedule. Revised schedule submitted to CNO
Jan 1970 Aggregate proposal of $3.2M submitted by Melpar
Mar 1970 DCAA Audit Report of Melpar. Government testing
temporarily resumes. RFT dates of 22 June and 25
August established
Apr 1970 Clarification Conference held with Melpar
Jun 1970 Majority of WST technical problems resolved.
Settlement offer rejected by Melpar
Aug 1970 Novation Agreement between ASI and Reflectone
Sep 1970 "Show cause" letter forwarded to ASI. ASI submits
revised claim for $2.3M. WST, Unit #2, delivered
to NAS Cecil Field
Mar 1971 Claim settlement with Link
Jun 1972 Two of four submissions of cost data submitted by
ASI. Contracting Officer issues unilateral deter-
mination
Aug 1972 ASI appeals to ASBCA
Feb 1973 ASBCA pre-hearing
$8

Apr 1973 Final contract settlement with Link
Aug 1973 Case removed from ASBCA Docket
Sep 1973 ASI submits collation of claims
May 1974 Final contract settlement with ASI
B. DEVICE 2F111: PROCUREMENT HISTORY
Feb 1969 Requirement for A-7E WST, Units #3 and #4, re-
stated
Sep 1972 CNO authorizes procurement of WST, Unit #3
Dec 1972 Contractual agreement with VSD for Device 2F111,
Unit #1
Sep 1973 CNO authorizes procurement of WST, Unit #4








Department of Defense Directive
SUBJECT: Acquisition of Major Defense Systems
I. PURPOSE
This Directive establishes policy for major defense system
acquisition in the Military Departments and Defense Agencies
(referred to as DoD Components).
II. APPLICATION
This Directive applies to major programs, so designated
by the Secretary of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense
(referred to as SecDef). This designation shall consider
(I) dollar value (programs which have an estimated RDT&E
cost in excess of 50 million dollars, or an estimated Pro-
duction cost in excess of 200million dollars); (2) national
urgency; (3) recommendations by DoD Component Heads or
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials. In addition,
the management principles in this Directive are applicable
to all programs.
III. POLICY
A. Mode of Operation - Successful development, production
and deployment of major defense systems are primarily
dependent upon competent people, rational priorities and
clearly defined responsibilities. Responsibility and
authority for the acquisition of major defense systems
shall be decentralized to the maximum practicable extent
consistent with the urgency and importance of each pro-
gram. The development and production of a major defense
system shall be managed by a single individual (program
manager) who shall have a charter which provides suffic-




Layers of authority between the program manager and his Component
Head shall be minimum. For programs involving two or more Com-
ponents, the Component having dominant interest shall designate the
program manager, and his charter shall be approved by the cognizant
official within OSD. The assignment and tenure of program managers
•hall be a matter of concern to DoD Component Heads and shall reflect
career incentii- -8 deponed to attract, retain and reward competent
personnel.
1. The DoD Components are responsible for identifying needs and
defining, developing and producing systems to satisfy those needs.
Component Heads are also responsible for contractor source
selection unless otherwise specified by the SecDef on a specific
program.
2. The OSD ; ?. responsible for (a) establishing acquisition policy,
(b) assuring that major defense system programs are pursued in
response to valid needs and (c) evaluating policy implementation
on each approved program.
3. The OSD and DoD Components are responsible for program monitor-
ing, but will place minimum demands for formal reporting on the
program manager. Nonrecurring needs for information will be kept
to a minimum and handled informally.
4. The SecDef will make the decisions which initiate program commit-
ments or increase those commitments. He may redirect a program
because of an actual or threatened breach of a program threshold
stated in an approved Development Concept Paper (DCP). The DCP
and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) will
support the SecDef decision-making. These decisions will be
reflected in the .iext submission of the Program Objective Memo-
randum (POM) by the DoD Component.
Conduct of Program - Because every program is different, successful
program conduct requires that sound judgment be applied in using the
management principles of this Directive. Underlying specific defense
system developments Is the need for a strong and usable technology
base. This base will be maintained by conducting research and advanced
technology effort independent of specific defense systems development.
Advanced technology effort includes prototyping, preferably using small.
efficient design teams and a minimum amount of documentation. The
objective is to obtain significant advances in technology at minimum cost.
I. Program Initiation
a. Early conceptual effort is normally conducted at the discretion







determines that a major defen 8 e system program should be
pursued. It i. crucial that the right decisions be made during
this conceptual effort; wrong decisions create problems not
easily overcome later in the program. Therefore, each DoD
Component will designate a single individual, such as the
Assistant Secretary for R&D, to be responsible for conceptual
efforts on new major program*'.
b. The considerations which support the determination of the need
for a system program, together with a plan for that program.
will be documented in the DCP. The DCP will define program
issues, including special logistics problems, program objectives.
program plans, performance parameters, areas of major risk.
system alternatives and acquisition strategy. The DCP will be
prepared by the DoD Component, following an agreement between
OSD and that Component on a DCP outline. The Director. Defense
Research and Engineering (DDR&E)(or the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Telecommunications) for his programs) has the basic
responsibility for coordination of inputs for the DCP and its
submittal to the DSARC for consideration and to the SecDef for
subsequent decision. If approved, the program will be conducted
within the DCP thresholds.
. Full-Scale Development. When the DoD Component is sufficiently
confident that program worth and readiness warrant commitment of
resources to full-scale development, it will request a SecDef deci-
sion to proceed. At that time, the DSARC will normally review
program progress and suitability to enter this phase and will forward
its recommendations to the SecDef for final decision. Such review
will confirm (a) the need for the selected defense system in consider-
ation of threat, system alternatives, special logistics needs, estimates
of development costs, preliminary estimates of life cycle costs and
potential benefits in context with overall DoD strategy and fiscal
guidance; (b) that development risks have been identified and solutions
are in hand; and (c) realism of the plan for full-scale development.
. Production/Deployment. When the DoD Component is sufficiently
confident that engineering is complete and that commitment of sub-
stantial resources to production and deployment is warranted, it
will request a SecDef decision to proceed. At that time, the DSARC
will again review program progress and suitability to enter substantial
product on/deployment and forward its recommendations to the SecDef
for final decision. Such review will confirm (a) the need for producing
the defense system in consideration of threat, estimated acquisition
and ownership costs and potential benefits in context with overall DoD
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strategy and fiscal guidance* (h\ fK-if a ^..,~*- i j* K ,i ' i D ' tnat a practical engineering design.
with adequate consideration of production and logistics problems is
complete; (c) that all previously identified technical uncertainties
have been res6lved and th it operational suitability has been deter-
mined by test and evaluation; and (d) the realism of the plan for the
remainder of the program. Some production funding for long lead
material or effort may be required prior to the production decision.
In such cases, the SecDef will decide whether a DSARC review and
revised DCP are required. In any event, full production go-ahead
will be authorised by approval of the DCP.
Program Considerations
jl. System need shall be clearly stated in operational terms, with appro-
priate limits, and shall be challenged throughout the acquisition
process. Statements of need/performance requirements shall be
matched where possible with existing technology. Wherever feasible,
operational needs shall be satisfied through use of existing military
or commercial hardware. When need can be satisfied only through
new development, the equivalent needs of the other DoD Components
shall be considered to guard against unnecessary proliferation.
2. Cost parameters shall be established which consider the cost of
acquisition and ownership; discrete cost elements (e.g.
, unit pro-
duction cost, operating and support cost) shall be translated into
•'design to" requirements. System development shall be continuously
evaluated against these requirements with the same rigor as that
applied to technical requirements. Practical tradeoffs shall be made
between system capability, cost and schedule. Traceability of esti-
mates and costing factors, including those for economic escalation,
shall be maintained.
3. Logistic support shall also be considered as a principal design para-
meter with the magnitude, scope and level of this effort in keeping
with the program phase. Early development effort will consider only
those parameters that are truly necessary to basic defense system
design, e. g. . those logistic problems that have significant impact on
system readiness, capability or cost. Premature introduction of
detailed operational support considerations is to be avoided.
\. Programs shall be structured and resources allocated to ensure that
the demonstration of actual achievement of program objectives is the






risk and worth shall be thereby established. Schedules shall be
subject to trade-off as much as any other program constraint.
Schedules and funding profiles shall be structured to accommodate
unforeseen problems and permit task accomplishment without
unnecessary overlapping or concurrency.
5. Technical uncertainty shall be continually assessed. Progressive
commitments of resources which incur program risk will be made
only when confidence in program outcome is sufficiently high to
warrant going ahead. Models, mock-ups and system hardware will
be used to the greatest possible extent to increase confidence level.
6. Test and evaluation shall commence as early as possible. A deter-
mination of operational suitability, including logietic support
requirements, will be made prior to large-scale production commit-
ments, making use of the most realistic test environmei.t possible
and the best representation of the future operational system available.
The results of this operational testing will be evaluated and presented
to the DSARC at the time of the production decision.
7. Contract type shall be consistent with all program characteristics
including risk. Jt is not possible to determine the precise production
cost of a new complex defense system before it is developed; therefore.
such systems will not be procured using the total package procurement
concept or production options that are contractually priced in the
development contract. Cost type prime and subcontracts are preferred
where substantial development effort is involved. Letter contracts
shall be minimized. When risk is reduced to the extent that realistic
pricing can occur, fixed-price type contracts should be issued. Changes
shall be limited to those that are necessary or offer significant benefit
to the DoD. Where change orders are necessary, they shall be con-
tractually priced or subject to an established ceiling before authoriza-
tion, except in patently impractical cases.
8. The source selection decision shall take into account the contractor's
capability to develop a necessary defense system on a timely and
cost-effective basis. The DoD Component shall have the option of
deciding whether or not the contract will be completely negotiated
before a program decision is made. Solicitation documents shall
require contractor identification of uncertainties and specific pro-
posals for their resolution. Solicitation and evaluation of proposals
should be planned to minimize contractor expense. Proposals for
cost-type or incentive contracts may be penalized during evaluation




9. Management information/program control requirements shall provide
information which is essential to effective management control.
Such information should be generated from data actually utilized by
contractor operating personnel and provided in summarized form for
successively higher level management and monitoring requirements.
A single, realistic work breakdown structure (WBS) shall be developed
for each program to provide a consistent framework for (a) planning
and assignment of responsibilities, (b) control and reporting of pro-
gress, and (c) establishing a data base for estimating the future cost
of defense systems. Contractor management information/program
control systems, and reports emanating therefrom, shall be utilized
to the maximum extent practicable. Government imposed changes to
contractor systems shall consist of only those necessary to satisfy
established DoD-wide standards. Documentation shall be generated
in the minimum amount to satisfy necessary and specific management
needs.
IMPLEMENTATION
Each DoD Component will implement this Directive within 90 days and
forward two (2) copies of each implementing document to the SecDef.
The number of implementing documents will be minimized and necessary
procedural guidance consolidated to the greatest extent possible. Selected
subjects to be covered by DoD Directives /Instructions or joint Service/
Agency documents in support of this Directive are listed in Enclosure I.
Each DoD Component will forward the joint Service/Agency documents
for which it is responsible to the SecDef for approval prior to issuance.





5000. 1 (Enci i)
Jul 13, 71
RELATED POLICY
Responsibility for the following policy documents is assigned to the
Cognizant Office indicated. In each case, the Cognizant Office shall
[a) generate the policy, or (b) delegate authority to a lead DoD
Component for preparation and subsequent issue of a joint Service/
Agency regulation, agreement or guide after approval by OSD.
Policy Subject
The DoD Technology Base
The DCP and the DSARC
Defense System Engineering
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